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Case No. 20140434-CA
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff!Appellee,
V.

LANE D. BIRD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution entered following a
conviction for securities fraud, a second degree felony.

This Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Lane D. Bird was convicted of securities fraud for, in
connection with the sale or offer of a security, willfully making numerous
false statements, omitting numerous material facts, and engaging in an act,
practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud on his victitns. His
victims, Bill and Susan Markham, were Defendant's next-door neighbors.
The Markhams invested $247,000 in a hand-lotion company Defendant was
promoting. Defendant did not disclose his prior bankruptcies, tax liens, and
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other civil judgments, nor did he disclose the financial disarray that the
hand-lotion venture was in. Defendant told the1n that he had invested half
a million of his own money in the venture, but he had not. Defendant also
told them that the money would be used to update and automate the
production equipment. But while some of the victims' money was used for
that purpose, most was not.
In exchange for the investment, Bill Markham was promised stock
and a position with the company. The original founder of the company
ousted Defendant after just a few months, but Bill stayed on for another two
years, working with the founder in a futile attempt to make the venture
profitable. Mired in debt and lacking in sales, the company never made a
profit. Bill shut the company down after the Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) seized and destroyed the company's product inventory because it
contained harmful bacteria.
The trial court sentenced Defendant to prison but suspended the
prison term and ordered Defendant to pay $164,723.17 in restitution.

In

calculating restitution, the trial court subtracted $82,276.83 from the victims'
initial investment of $247,000 to account for the value of fixed assets that Bill
had assumed control of after Defendant was no longer involved in the
venture. But the trial court declined to adjust the figure to account for the

-2-
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product inventory that Defendant had relinquished to Bill, explaining that
the product inventory was worthless because the FDA confiscated it.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to offset the

amount of restitution to account for product inventory from which the
victims never received any benefit?

Standard of Review.

While the trial court's interpretation of the

relevant restitution statutes is reviewed for correctness, its application of
those statutes in ordering restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See

State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 5, 353 P.3d 179; State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d
5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A h·ial court will be dee1ned to have abused its

discretion only if no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146,

il 5 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original).
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that

Defendant caused the victims' loss?

Standard of Review. Review is for clear error. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:

-3-
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• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 (West 2012)
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-3 (West 2012)
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21 (West 2012)
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 (West 2012)
• Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (West 2015)
• Utah Code Aim. §77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2015)
• Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301 (West 2004)
G
Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2015).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves Defendant's challenge to the amount of restitution
he was ordered to pay his victims. Defendant was charged with theft and
securities fraud. Rl-2. He was tried before the court and acquitted of theft
but convicted of securities fraud. R121-22. As part of Defendant's sentence,
the court ordered him to pay $164,723.17 in restitution. R121-22; *157; 231. 1

A. Summary offacts. 2

By January 2007, Bill and Susan had lived next door to Defendant for
about six years.

R346:21.

They enjoyed a "very friendly relationship,"

going to dinner together occasionally, interacting through church, and
talking about each other's jobs when they crossed paths. R346:21-23. Based

1

After page 178 in the record, the numbering mistakenly reverts to
149. To avoid confusion, any citation to the second occurrence of pages
149-78 will be preceded by an asterisk.
2

Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the verdict, the facts are presented in a manner
consistent with that verdict. Conflicting evidence is addressed only to the
extent necessary to understand the issues on appeal.
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on these interactions and Bill's observation of Defendant's lifestyle, Bill
viewed Defendant as a successful entrepreneur. R346:23-26. Bill and Susan
trusted Defendant. R346:111; 137.
Around January or February 2007, Defendant approached Bill about
investing in a venture Defendant was involved in. R346:26-27. The venture
involved producing and distributing a hand lotion that, when dried, formed
a barrier to protect hands from acid, dirt, and grease. R346:26-27, 40-41. A
man named Omar Bonada had developed the lotion and was trying to
produce and distribute it and had brought in Defendant to help with
distribution and sales. R346:32; 347:369, 390-91. Defendant told Bill that the
venture had been experiencing "exponential growth," and that they were
looking for $250,000 in capital to update and automate the "antiquated"
production equipment so they could keep pace with de1nand. R346:26-27,
30, 61-62.

Defendant and Omar entered an agreement where Omar's company,
ClarconLab, LLC, was dissolved and two new companies were formed: one
to handle production-Clarcon Labs, Inc. - and another to handle
dish·ibution and marketing-Clarcon Distributing Inc. R346:85; 347:390-91.
Defendant told Bill that he was part owner of Clarcon Labs and full owner
of Clarcon Distributing.

R343:21-22; 346:34.

-5-
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prospectus he had developed, projecting over $15.4 million in profits for the
first year; a copy of several invoices, showing sales that had been made by
Omar's company over the past few months; and some checks, ostensibly
indicating payment on some of the invoices. R343:62-63; 346:48, 50; SEl, 2.
Defendant also told Bill that it was a "solid" investment. R346:45. In
fact, he told Bill and Susan that he believed the product would be so
successful that he had put everything he had into the venture, investing
$500,000 of his own money by taking out a second mortgage on his house
and borrowing from his father. R343:28; 346:44-45, 125-26. Defendant also
gave Bill a tour of the factory, introduced hiln to 01nar, and later showed
Bill a stockpile of inventory that Omar had given Defendant as "security"
for any investments that Defendant brought in. R343:17; 346:41-43.
Bill and Susan agreed to invest with the understanding that their
money would be used for updating and automating the production
equipment.

R343:34; 346:61-62, 73, 97, 122, 124.

To come up with the

money, Bill and Susan took out a second mortgage on their home, Susan
liquidated her retirement account, and Bill borrowed $50,000 from his aunt.
R343:45; 346:52-53, 74-76. In six separate payments between March 7, 2007,
and May 16, 2007, Bill and Susan gave a total of $247,000 to Clarcon Labs
and Clarcon Distributing. SE6.
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After most of that amount had been invested, Defendant and Bill
signed an agreement on April 11, 2007, memorializing the arrangement.
SES. In exchange for the investment, Bill would become the Executive Vice
President of Clarcon Distributing and would oversee marketing and sales.
R346:64; SES.

He would receive a salary once the company became

profitable, plus a commission on subordinates' sales. R346:64; 347:432; SES.
He would be given a 5% share of stock in Clarcon Labs and a 25% share of
stock in Clarcon Distributing. R346:109-10; SES. Bill would also become
Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of Clarcon Labs, but with no
significant role in that company. R346:73; SES. Defendant represented that
he presently owned stock in the two companies and had the right to assign
it. SES.
In fact, the companies had never issued any stock because, as
Defendant later acknowledged, there was no value in the companies at that
point. R343:103; R347:458, 482. Defendant had registered the companies
just days before Bill signed the agreement, even listing Bill as an officer of
Clarcon Distributing without his knowledge. R343:21, 32; 346:85-86; SE14,
15.

Over several formal and informal pre-investment conversations with
the Markhams, Defendant never told

-7-
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prior

bankruptcies. R346:109, 131; SE41, 42. Nor did he tell them about several
civil judgments and tax liens against him.

R346:109, 131; SE23-33, 35.

Regarding the Clarcon venture, Defendant never gave the Markhams any
audited financial statements or other documents that showed the venture' s
assets and liabilities. R343:39; 346:49, 127. Defendant never discussed any
of ClarconLab' s debts, nor did he tell the Markhams that ClarconLab was
borrowing money from other companies in which Defendant was a
principal to meet operating expenses and pay salaries. R343:27-28; 346:99,
106. Defendant later characterized the financial and managerial state of
ClarconLab- and, indeed, everything about the venture- as "a mess" and
said that he had intended to use the inveshnent "'to help Omar out of a ...
bad situation."' R347:382, 434-38, 462. But Defendant did not convey that
to the Markhams. R346:45, 122, 128, 150; 347:434.
Defendant used Bill and Susan's money to buy some new production
equipment, but he spent much of it to cover salaries and bills and to repay
over $68,000 that Defendant had borrowed from another one of his
ventures, Powerslide Tools, Inc. R343:93; 346:129, 190, 196; SE9. In fact, for
nearly the first two months of each company's existence, the operating
accounts for both Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing consisted almost
solely of the funds Defendant received from the Markhams. R346:l 77-87;

-8-
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SE7 at 1-4 (Clarcon Dish~ibuting check register listing $127.50 in deposits
from sources other than the Markhams between March 8, 2007, and May 1,
2007, compared with $170,300 in deposits from the Markhams); SES at 1-10
(Clarcon Labs check register listing $970.66 in deposits from sources other
than the Markhams between March 27, 2007, and June 4, 2007, compared
with $127,000 in deposits from the Markhams). Defendant thus used the
Markhams' money to cover all operating expenses during that time period
and beyond. R346:128, 177-87; SE7 at 1-4; SE8 at 1-8. see also R346:197-98
(describing first-in, first-out rule of forensic accounting, whereby expenses
are not attributed to new deposits until preexisting funds- here, the
Markhams' investment- are exhausted).
Bill began working part time at Clarcon Distributing in April 2007.
R346:88-89. He started to review the books for Clarcon Lab and Clarcon
Distributing. R346:94-95. In May 2007, about a week after he had given his
last check to Defendant, Bill noticed large payments to Powerslide and
asked Defendant about it. R346:89-90, 92-95. Defendant explained that he
was part owner of Powerslide and had used Powerslide to pay some of the
operating expenses for the Clarcon venture and, given his ownership
interest in each company, Defendant said "he had the right to pass the
monies back and forth as he saw fit." R346:99, 105-06, 148-49.

-9-
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Bill also noticed that while Clarcon Labs was updating some
equipment, it was not doing so as quickly as he had wanted. R346:89-90.
Although Defendant had told Bill not to talk to Omar about finances or
other business matters-Omar and Defendant supposedly had

an

agreement that Defendant would be the point of contact for all investorsBill approached Omar sometime in late May about his concerns. R346:89,
99-103.

In the course of that conversation, Bill mentioned Defendant's

personal investment of half a million dollars in the company, and Omar
became angry. R346:100. The two confronted Defendant, and Defendant
acknowledged that he had not put any money into the company, but
reasoned that he had put that much into the company "in the form of his
time and efforts." R346:102-03.
On June 1, 2007, Omar ousted Defendant from Clarcon Labs.
R346:103-04; DEll.

Defendant initially tried to continue working with

Clarcon Distributing- based out of his personal office-but the relationship
with Bill had soured and Defendant soon relinquished any control over
Clarcon Dish·ibuting.

R343:97; 347:422, 424, 471.

In July 2007, Bill and

Susan met with Defendant at his office. Defendant admitted that he had
lied about investing his own money in the venture, apologized, and said
that he had done it because he thought the Markhams would not invest if
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they did not think he had "smne skin in the game." 346:106-07, 130, 158.
Defendant gave Bill the inventory he had been holding in his office as
security, which was valued at $500,000 retail. R346:125, 156; 347:346, 379,
426. 3
Defendant dissolved Clarcon Distributing; Omar dissolved Clarcon
Labs; and on June 8, 2007, Bill and Omar formed Clarcon Biological
Chemistry Laboratory, Inc. SE14, 15, 16. For the next two years, the two
tried to salvage the company but were never able to produce and market
the product like they had hoped. R343:61, 114; 347:107. Bill began looking
at all the records from the various c01npanies- some of which he had not
seen before Defendant left, R343:74-75, 94-98-and realized that the
financial condition of the venture as of June 2007 was "[p]retty bad": "Lot of
debt. Lot of overhead. Virtually nothing in sales." R346:78, 107. As one
salesman described it, other than a few small transactions, most sales were
"preliminary." R347:353. And that financial picture did not improve over

3

Bill estimated the retail value of the inventory when it was first
shown to him as $1.5-$2 million, based on the prices Defendant had quoted
him when Bill was considering whether to invest. R343:29-30. But
everyone else, including Defendant, valued the inventory at $500,000.
R346:125, 156 (Susan); 347:346 (a salesman); 347:379 (Defendant).

-11-
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the next two years. Many promising distributors had simply signed letters
of interest that never materialized into actual sales. R343:89, 110, 121-22.
In 2009, Bill and Omar began the process for FDA approval in an
effort to convince reluctant distributors to purchase the product. R343:111.
The FDA conducted site inspections in April and May 2009 and informed
the company of several necessary procedural safeguards. R156-60; 343:111.
But when the FDA tested the lotion, it found harmful bacteria in it and in
June 2009 ordered the company to recall and destroy the product. R153-55;
343:111-12. Unsatisfied with the company's efforts to do so, the FDA had
U.S. Marshals seize the remaining inventory on July 31, 2009.

R153-55;

343:112-13. Bill and Omar then dissolved the company. 343:110-11; SE16.
At no point did any of the four Clarcon companies make a profiteither before Bill invested, while he worked with Defendant, or after
Defendant left. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482.
What sales they did have were never enough to cover operating expense
and payments on debt. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:417, 431-32. Other
than one check for $1,129.67, Bill never received any salary or commissions
while Defendant was involved in the venture. R346:78; SES at 7. "Sales
apparently were not there, and there [were] no commissions to be paid."
R346:78. Hoping to make their initial $247,000 investment bear fruit, Bill
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and Susan put an additional $193,000 into the venture after Defendant left,
bringing their total cash investment to $440,000. R346:108. Bill worked 60
to 80 hours per week in the mortgage industry to pay bills and to
"subsidize" the Clarcon venture. R346:108. By 2012, the Markhams were on
the verge of having to sell their house because they could not make
payments on the second mortgage. R346:108, 137-38. As Bill described the
situation, "It's like being 18 years old all over again and having to start over
financially." R346: 108-09.
B. Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Defendant with one count of theft and one count of
securities fraud, both second degree felonies. Rl-2. A bench trial was held
August 28 and 29, 2012. R84-87.
The Markhams testified for the State in a manner consistent with the
facts discussed above.

The State also presented testimony from an

investigator with the Utah Division of Securities and an expert on securities
law. R346:18, 114, 164; 347:235, 240. Defendant called his sister-who had
worked at Clarcon Distributing as a bookkeeper while Defendant was
involved with the company-and a salesman who had also worked with
Clarcon Distributing during that time. R347:294-95, 331, 333-34. Defendant
also took the stand and disputed almost every aspect of the Markhams'
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testimony. See, e.g., R347:386-87, 392, 410, 413, 425-26, 469, 471. Defendant
did not, however, dispute that the Clarcon venture was "a mess," mired in
debt, and unprofitable. 347:382, 417,432, 434-38, 476,482.
The court acquitted Defendant of the theft charge but found him
guilty of securities fraud. R87. It sentenced him to one to fifteen years in
prison and fined him $10,000, but suspended the sentence and fine and
placed him on probation and ordered hhn to serve 180 days in jail. R121-22.
The Markhams had submitted a letter, asking the court not to send
Defendant to prison but to order him to pay restitution. R118. The court
scheduled a restitution hearing for a later date. R122.
The State filed a restitution request for $247,000- the amount of the
Markhams' initial inveshnent in the venture. R134-35. The State argued
that the Markhams had relied on Defendant's statements in making the
investment, were never given stock in the company as promised, were
never repaid the $247,000, and never received any return on their
investment. R135-36. In support, the State referred to the trial testimony
and attached copies of the checks the Markhams had used to pay
Defendant. R135, 139-45.
Defendant objected to the State's request. R148-50. He argued that
the Markhams had "not suffered an actual loss in this case."

-1.4-
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R148.

Defendant asserted that because Bill became involved in the company and
Defendant had turned over assets and inventory worth between $1 million
and $1.5 million, the Markhams had not actually lost anything.

R149.

Defendant relied on the trial record, a number of attachments identifying
the inventory he had returned to Bill, and the FDA's report following its site
inspection. R149-50, 152-78.
The parties waived their right to a hearing on restitution, and the trial
court decided the issue based on the record before it, which included the
case file.

R*153.

The trial court concluded that the Markhams did not

receive any return on their $247,000 investment. R*155. It found that the
only thing of value the Markhams received in exchange for their investment
was $82,276.83 worth of fixed assets Bill had retained when he assumed
control of the Clarcon venture. 4 R*155. The court thus offset the $247,000
loss by $82,276.83. R*155. But the court declined to further offset the loss
based on the value of the product inventory because the government had
seized it. R*156. Finally, the court concluded that Defendant's conduct was
the but-for cause of the Markhams' loss, and that the loss had "a sufficient
causal nexus in fact and time with Defendant's securities fraud."
4

R*155.

The fixed assets included labelers, drill presses, processing
machinery, raw ingredients, a greenhouse, a desk, computers, office
equipment, and lab equipment. R*155.
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The court thus ordered complete and court-ordered restitution of
$164,723.17.

R*156.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was

denied, and he timely appealed the underlying restitution order. R267, 285.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I. In challenging the restitution order, Defendant argues that
the Markhams did not actually suffer any loss because Defendant gave Bill
product inventory that exceeded the value of the Markhams' investment.
Defendant argues that the restitution order thus should have been offset by
the value of that inventory, resulting in no restitution.

Defendant also

argues that he did not cause the Markhams' loss because he was convicted
only of selling securities without a license, which could not be the but-for
cause of the Markhams' loss.

Furthermore, Defendant argues that any

causal nexus is too attenuated because the Markhams' loss occurred in 2009,
as a result of Bill's failure to follow FDA regulations-long after Defendant
was no longer involved in the venture.
The inventory the Markhams received did not reduce the losses they
incurred because the inventory was not sufficiently valuable to cover the
venture' s operating expenses and debt. The Markhams received no profit
from their investment; indeed, they did not even recover the principal they
invested.

-16-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Moreover, the record clearly establishes that Defendant was charged
with, convicted of, and sentenced for securities fraud, not selling securities
without a license. And Defendant's many fraudulent state1nents, omissions,
and other actions are the but-for cause of the Markhams' loss; without
Defendant's fraudulent actions, the Markhams would not have invested
their money in a failed venture.
Furthermore, the causal nexus between Defendant's fraudulent
actions and the Markhams' loss is not attenuated either factually or
temporally.

Attenuation occurs when the loss is attributable to some

intervening cause that is not reasonably foreseeable. But the Markhams'
loss occurred in 2007 - a direct result of Defendant's fraudulent actions when they invested their money in a failed venture. Bill's efforts over the
next two years were nothing more than a futile attempt to salvage that
investment. And the FDA's seizure of the property and Bill's dissolution of
the company merely marked the end of that futile two-year attempt to
recoup his lost inveshnent. In any event, given the financial disarray of the
venture, the ultimate failure of the venture was reasonably foreseeable at
the time of Defendant's fraud.
Issue II. Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support

the trial court's conclusion that he caused the Markhams' loss.
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But the

evidence demonstrates that any sales were insufficient to generate a profit
given the venture's debts and operating expenses.

The undisputed

evidence at trial was that no Clarcon entity ever made a profit.

The

evidence thus supports the trial court's finding that Defendant caused the
Markhams' loss when he convinced them to invest in a failed venture by
willfully misstating and omitting material facts.

ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges only the restitution order entered against him.
He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction or any other aspect of his conviction or sentence.

And his

challenge to the restitution order is based only on whether the Markhams
suffered any loss, whether Defendant is responsible for any loss they did
suffer, and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's
conclusion that the security the Markhams received for their investment
was worthless.
The record is clear that the Markhams suffered a loss of well over
$164,000-the amount Defendant was ordered to pay. Defendant-and not
Bill, the FDA, or anyone else-caused that loss. The security the Markhams
received for their investment was Bill's equity position in the venture. And
the evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that that security was

-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

worthless, not just when the FDA confiscated the company's inventory,
but-accounting for the company's liabilities-when Defendant gave the
inventory to Bill.
I.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
ACTED
WITHIN
ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT CREDITED DEFENDANT
FOR THE VALUE OF FIXED ASSETS THE VICTIMS
ACQUIRED, BUT REFUSED TO CREDIT HIM FOR
PRODUCT INVENTORY FROM WHICH THE VICTIMS
RECEIVED NO BENEFIT.
Defendant argues that restitution is inappropriate for three reasons:
(1) the Markhams did not suffer any loss because Defendant gave them
product inventory that exceeded the value of their investment; (2)
Defendant was convicted only of, or has accepted responsibility only for,
selling a security without a license, and that conduct was not the but-for
cause of any loss suffered by the Markhams; and (3) because Defendant was
not involved in the Clarcon venture when the FDA seized the inventory,
any loss was too attenuated from Defendant's actions.
Defendant's arguments are foreclosed by the record.

First, the

inventory was insufficient to cover the value of the Markhams' investment
because the company was mired in debt, lacking in sales, and peddling an
unsafe product that the FDA eventually confiscated. Second, Defendant
was convicted of securities fraud for engaging in an act, practice, or course
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of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon the Markhams, and for
making numerous material misstate1nents and 01nissions to induce the
Markhams to invest. That fraudulent activity was the but-for cause of the
Markhams putting their money into a failed investment and not receiving
any benefit in return. Third, the Markhams' loss is not too attenuated from
Defendant's conduct because the Clarcon venture was a failed venture from
the beginning. Aside from a single thousand-dollar check, the Markhams
never recouped any of their principal despite Bill's prolonged efforts to
salvage the investment. That Bill was ultimately unsuccessful at doing so
does not break the causal chain.
Restitution

serves

compensatory,

deterrent,

and

rehabilitative

purposes. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I18, 214 P.3d 104. Chief among
those purposes is "making crime victims whole for the harms they suffer
because of a defendant's criminal conduct." State v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT
App 138, ~13, 351 P.3d 826 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. granted,
363 P.3d 523. Thus, "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or damage to a
victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts of a particular case."

State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,I15, 82 P.3d 211. Trial courts are therefore
"granted flexibility in determining damages in order to 'fashion an
equitable award to the victim."' Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, if13 (quoting
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~·

Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ifl4); see also Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d
465, 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[R]ules relating to the measure of damages

are flexible, and can be modified in the interest of fairness." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The h·ial court properly exercised that flexibility when it decided to
credit Defendant for fixed assets turned over to Bill, but declined to credit
Defendant for inventory that was insufficient to cover Bill's liabilities and
ultimately deemed worthless.
A.

The victims suffered a loss of over $164,000, even
accounting for the value of the inventory Defendant
returned.
Defendant argues that as a matter of law, any property returned to

the Markhams must be used to offset the amount of their loss. Aplt. Br. at
28-32. Defendant thus argues that the Markhams were compensated when

Defendant gave Bill the product inventory Defendant had been holding as
security. Aplt. Br. at 23, 25. In other words, Defendant challenges whether
the Markhams in fact suffered any loss.
The State agrees that the value of any loss should be offset by the
value of any income the Markhams received from their investment. But the
record supports the conclusion that, aside from a single thousand-dollar
check, the Markhams received nothing for their investment because the
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company's liabilities always exceeded its assets, the company had trouble
selling its products, what sales it did have were never sufficient to cover
expenses, and the inventory was ultimately seized.
The Crime Victims Restitution Act authorizes a sentencing court to
impose restitution "[w]hen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that
has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301 (West
2004); id. §77-38a-302(1) (West Supp. 2015). 5 The statute defines "pecuniary
damages" as "all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a person could
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities." Id. §77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2015). The
relevant civil-action analog

to

securities

fraud

involving material

representations and omissions is a civil action under section 61-1-22 of the
Utah Code.

See id. §61-1-22(1) (West 2012) (authorizing a civil action to

recover for violations of section 61-1-1(2)).
Section 61-1-22 provides two bases for calculating damages. The first
applies when the victim returns the security he or she purchased.

The

statute allows the victim to recover the consideration paid for the security,

5

Defendant cites the current version of the Utah Code for all statutory
citations in his opening brief and does not argue that any a1nendment
affects the outco1ne of this case. The State likewise cites the current version
of the Utah Code for all statutory citations.
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"less the amount of income received on the security." Id. §61-1-22(1)(b).
The second allows the victim to recover "da1nages" if the victim no longer
owns the security. Id. Such damages are calculated by subtracting from the
value of the consideration "the amount of income received on the security"
and "the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security." Id.
§61-1-22(1)(b), (c)(i). 6
As Defendant acknowledges, the second approach applies here
because Bill no longer owns the security.

Aplt. Br. at 30-31.

But

Defendant's application of the statute is inconsistent with the facts of this
case.

In exchange for his investment, Bill received partial ownership of

6

Although the provision addressing how to calculate damages crossreferences "Subsection (7)(b)," that cross-reference is most likely a
typographical error and was intended to be "Subsection (1)(b)." See Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(c). Although section 61-1-22 contains a subsection
7(b), the cross-reference to subsection 7(b) is illogical and, if applied, absurd.
The statute says to "subtract from the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender under Subsection (7)(b) the value of the security when the
buyer disposed of the security." Id. Subsection 7(b) refers to situationspatently inapplicable here-where recovery is prohibited, and says nothing
of a tender. Id. §61-1-22(7)(b). Thus, if read literally, damages would be
calculated by subtracting from $0-that is, from the amount recoverable
under subsection (7)(b)- the value of the security when it was disposed of.
In other words, the victim would be required to pay the fraudster. The
better reading of the statute is to read the "tender" reference as referring to
the victhn's return of the security discussed in subsection (1)(b). See State v.
Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, if 31, 243 P.3d 1250 ("We read statutory provisions literally,
unless such a reading would result in an unreasonable or inoperable result."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing and at least the promise of stock, if
not the actual thing. It is that security- and not the inventory - that is to be
valued when considering the Markhams' loss.
evidence from trial is undisputed:

See §61-1-22(1). And the

The Markhams did not recover the

principal they invested and they received no profits frmn that investment,
either before Clarcon Lab and Clarcon Distributing were dissolved or
during the two years following that dissolution. R343:99-100, 121; 346:78,
107; 347:382, 432, 467-68, 476, 482. Aside frmn a single check for $1,129.67,
Bill never received any salary or commission from the venture. R346:78;
347:432; SE8 at 7.

Even factoring in the $500,000 worth of inventory

Defendant returned to the venture, the Markhams did not receive any
income from it because sales were at best anemic and because expenses far
exceeded any sales revenue. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:353, 476. Thus,
at most, $1,129.67 in "income received on the security" could be subtracted
from the $247,000 consideration the Markhams paid for that security,
yielding a net loss of $245,870.33. See id. §61-1-22(1)(b).
But the damages are not reduced any further by subtracting "the
value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security." Id. §61-122(1)(c)(i). Bill disposed of the security-his position in Clarcon Labs and
Clarcon Dish·ibuting-when the two companies were dissolved. But even
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accounting for the $82,276.83 worth of fixed assets and $500,000 worth of
inventory, the Markhams' security was worthless when the companies were
dissolved because the companies' liabilities far outweighed any of the
assets. R343:107; 347:476, 482. In light of the venture' s abysmal financial
state, the trial court would have been well within its discretion to order
restitution of at least $245,870.33, and not to offset the Markhams' damages
by the face value of the company's fixed assets. 7
The calculus does not improve for Defendant if disposal of the
security is measured from late 2009 when Bill finally gave up on the
venture. Cf Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, iJ 57, 201 P.3d 966,

holding modified on other grounds by Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v.
King, 2013 UT 13, ~57, 297 P.3d 619 (concluding in a common law

fraudulent inducement suit that "the employee is entitled to recover the
difference between the compensation provided by the employer whom the
employee was induced to leave and the compensation that follows"). The
Markhams still had not made any income on their investment, R343:99-100,
108-09, 121; 346:78, 107, and the inventory was rendered worthless when
7

The trial court's restitution award is also conservative in light of
section 61-1-22's explicit authorization of 12% annual interest as recoverable
damages and treble damages for intentional or reckless securities offenses.
See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(c)(ii), (2)(a). The single thousand-dollar
check Bill received did not even cover one month's interest.
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the FDA seized it, R153-55; 343:112-13. Thus, over the two-year period that
Bill headed the venture, there was no income and no value in the security to
subtract from the consideration paid by the Markhams in 2007.
Furthermore, the trial court would have been within its broad
discretion to order even more restitution than it did for yet another reason.
Section 61-1-22 states that the civil remedy it provides is "in addition to any
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity." Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-22(10)(a). 8

Under a common law suit for fraudulent

inducement, the Markhams could have recovered far more than the
consideration paid for the worthless security. Utah follows the benefit-ofthe-bargain rule. E.g., Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974). Under
that rule, "in an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the
difference between the actual value of what the party received and the
value thereof if it had been as represented." Id. In other words, damages
are not limited to the consideration paid for the security or other out-ofpocket expenses. Id. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §376
8

A civil action under section 61-1-22 is also limited to violations of
section 61-1-1(2) (fraudulent statements and omissions) and other statutes
not relevant here. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(a). It does not cover
violations of section 61-1-1(3) (fraudulent or deceitful acts, practices, or
courses of business). Id. Defendant was charged with both variants of
securities fraud, and the trial court concluded that the evidence supported
each variant. R2, *155.
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(defining the benefit-of-the-bargain rule as "a punitive measure which
compels a party guilty of fraud to make good his or her representations").
Here, Defendant falsely told Bill that Clarcon Distributing was a "solid"
investment with projected profits of over $15.4 million in the first year.
R346:45; SEl. Bill was promised a 25% stake in the company, which would

translate to over $3.8 million in projected profits. SES. Given the common
law rule, the State's requested restitution and the trial court's order were
quite conservative.
In sum, regardless of what timeframe is used to measure the
Markhams' loss, the inventory did not compensate them for their
investment in light of the complete evidentiary picture. The Markhams thus
lost at least $164,000 of their investment due to Defendant's fraudulent
actions, and the trial court was well within its discretion to order restitution
in that amount.
B. Defendant was convicted of securities fraud-not
transacting business as an unlicensed broker-dealer
or agent-and those fraudulent actions were the butfor cause of the victims' loss.
Defendant argues that his actions are not the but-for cause of the
Markhams' loss because he was convicted of- or at least accepted
responsibility only for-selling securities without a license. Aplt. Br. at 24,
26, 30.
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Contrary to Defendant's repeated assertions, Defendant was charged
with, convicted of, and sentenced for securities fraud under section 61-1-1 of
the Utah Code, not selling a security without a license or transacting
business as an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent in violation of section 611-3. Rl-2, 121; R347:530. And Defendant's fraudulent actions are the direct
cause of the Markhams parting with their money and joining a failed
venture.
As noted, the Crime Victims Restitution Act authorizes restitution
"[w]hen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301. As the statute suggests,
there must be a causal nexus between the defendant's criminal activity and
the pecuniary damages suffered by the victim. This Court has defined the
requisite causal nexus using a modified but-for test: "A modified 'but for'
test requires that (1) the damages 'would not have occurred but for the
conduct underlying the . . . [defendant's] conviction' and (2) the 'causal
nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated
(either factually or temporally)."' State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ifll, 221
P.3d 273 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting State v. McBride,
940 P.2d 539,544 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).
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But before causation can be determined, the court must first
determine what" criminal activity" is at issue. See Utah Code Ann. §77-38a301.

The statute defines criminal activity as

II

any offense of which the

defendant is convicted." Id. §77-38a-102(2). Criminal activity also includes
11

any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility

to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct." Id. Here, Defendant was convicted of securities fraud
under section 61-1-1, not engaging in unlicensed transactions under section
61-1-3.
Section 61-1-3 makes it unlawful for anyone to transact business "as a
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed" to do so. Utah Code
11

Ann. §61-1-3(1) (West 2012); see also id. §61-1-13(1)(c)(i) (defining brokerdealer" in part as "a person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others or for the person's own account").
Section 61-1-1 makes it unlawful for anyone-licensed or not- "in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security" to either
directly or indirectly (1) "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud"; (2) make "any untrue statement of a material fact" or omit to
make any statement of material fact that would render the statement not
misleading; or (3) "engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Id. §61-11. Securities fraud under section 61-1-1 may be a second degree felony
depending on the value of the security or the circumstances of the victim,
but engaging in securities transactions without a license is punishable only
as a third degree felony. Id. §61-1-21(1), (2) (West 2012).
The criminal information filed in this case referred to the second and
third variants of securities fraud under section 61-1-1, and it charged
Defendant with a second degree felony.

Rl-2.

The testimony and

argument presented by both parties at trial extensively covered the issue of
whether Defendant willfully misrepresented or omitted material facts when
he pitched the investment to the Markhams.
(prosecutor's

closing

argument);

R347:507-24

See, e.g., R347:491-507
(defendant's

closing

argument). And the few times Defendant's lack of a license came up at trial
was always to emphasize that Defendant never told the Markhams that he was
unlicensed to sell securities.

R346:109, 130-31.

When the trial court

,:,,,:,

announced its verdict, it specifically mentioned misrepresentations and
omissions and stated that Defendant was guilty of securities fraud, not
selling securities without a license. R347:530. Accordingly, the trial court
sentenced Defendant for second degree felony securities fraud. R121. The
h·ial court reiterated that fact in its restitution order when it stated, "The
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facts proven at trial demonstrated that Defendant made numerous untrue
statements of material fact, omitted to state numerous material facts, and
engaged in an act, practice, or course of business which operated as a fraud
or deceit upon the Markhams."

R*155.

And the trial court rejected

Defendant's argument, made in a motion to reconsider the restitution order,
that it had incorrectly entered a conviction under section 61-1-1 rather than
61-1-3. R344:11.
Defendant cites no record support for his assertion that he was
convicted and sentenced for transacting business as an unlicensed brokerdealer or agent. Aplt. Br. at 24, 26, 30. And he acknowledges that the trial
court specifically rejected this argument below. Aplt. Br. at 16; R344:11. The
only evidence Defendant points to in the record is his statement to the
investigator who prepared the presentence report, where Defendant
accepted responsibility only for selling a security without a license. 9 R101.
But Defendant's refusal to accept responsibility for the crime for which

he was convicted is irrelevant to the question of what losses his crilninal

9

Defendant also asserts on appeal that he made similar statements at
the sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 30. But Defendant did not provide a
transcript of the sentencing hearing on appeal and thus caimot rely on what
was said there to support his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); State v.
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211, if 4, 257 P.3d 1103 (per curiam) (" An appellant has
the burden to provide an adequate record for review.").

-31-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

activity caused.

As noted, the law authorizes the sentencing court to

impose restitution resulting from criminal conduct for which a defendant
admits responsibility, even if the defendant was not convicted based on that
conduct. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(1)(b), (4)(a) (West 2015); id. §77-38a102(2); id. §77-38a-302(1), (5)(a). But restitution is not limited to what a
defendant is willing to pay. The court may also impose restitution for any
loss caused by a crime for which a defendant was actually convicted. See id.
§§76-3-201(1)(b), (4)(a); 77-38a-102(2); 77-38a-302(1), (5)(a); State v. Poulsen,
2012 UT App 292, iflO, 288 P.3d 601; State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,
9, 60 P.3d 582.

if 18-

To hold otherwise would create a strong incentive for

defendants to deny responsibility for the crimes for which they have been
convicted in an attempt to limit restitution.
In 1nost cases, the criminal conviction itself satisfies the requirement
that "liability is clear as a matter of law" before entering an order for
restitution. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The
defendant's refusal to admit responsibility for criminal activity only
becomes an issue when the trial court attempts to order restitution for losses
not caused by the crime for which the defendant was convicted or pleaded
guilty. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, ,r9, 221 P.3d 277 (holding
that h ial court may not infer criminal liability for actions not covered by
1
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defendant's guilty plea); State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ,IS, 987 P.2d 1289
(same). That is not the case here.
Because Defendant was convicted of securities fraud, the causal link
between Defendant's criminal activity and the Markhams' loss must focus
on Defendant's fraudulent actions, misrepresentations, and omissions, not
his licensing status. But for Defendant's fraud, the Markhams would not
have parted with their money and invested in a failed venture. Bill and
Susan both testified that Defendant's false statement that he had invested
$500,000 of his own money was important to their decision to invest.
R346:45, 125-26.

Susan was leery of investing in a new company that

needed investors' money to function. R346:125-26. The financial records
submitted at trial demonstrate that Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing
were dependent on the Markhams' investment to meet day-to-day
operating expenses and to pay off debts-not simply to update antiquated
production equipment. SE7, 8. Had the Markhams known that, they would
not have invested. Defendant's fraudulent statements and omissions were
thus the but-for cause of the Markhams losing their investment.
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C. The victims' loss did not become too attenuated from
Defendant's fraudulent actions simply because
Defendant was not involved in the venture when it
was finally terminated.
In addition to but-for causation, restitution requires that the victims'
loss not be factually or temporally too attenuated from the Defendant's
criminal actions. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ifll. Defendant argues that the
State cannot meet the second part of the causation test because the
Markhams lost the value of their investment in 2009 when the FDA seized
the inventory from Bill's company. 10 Defendant asserts that event was too
attenuated from Defendant's fraudulent actions both factually

and

temporally. Aplt. Br. at 24-26. Defendant also argues that the h·ial court
"decline[ d] to consider [his] position that Markham's losses were caused by
Markham's own negligence in not abiding by FDA regulations." Aplt. Br. at
37. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,

if 27 n.4 (noting that in detennining

amount of restitution, the trial court "cannot decline to consider evidence
that a victim's losses were caused" by someone other than defendant).
The h·ial court considered Defendant's arguments and the evidence
he presented in support. R*153. That the h·ial court viewed the evidence
0

Defendant actually frames his argument in terms of the FDA
shutting down Bill's company. But Bill was adamant at trial that the FDA
did not shut down the co1npany, nor did it force Bill and Omar to do so.
R343:110-12. They may have been left with little choice given the
circmnstances, but it was still their choice to make.
'
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differently than Defendant does not mean the trial court declined to
consider it. In light of the record evidence, the trial court's conclusion was
reasonable. Indeed, when the full evidentiary picture is viewed, the causal
nexus is clear and strong. The Markhams lost the value of their investment
because they invested in a debt-ridden company that had trouble
generating sales, and they were induced to invest by Defendant's material
misrepresentations and mnissions. The FDA' s seizure of the unsafe product
merely marked the end to Bill's prolonged and futile attempt to salvage
something from what had been a failed inveshnent from the beginning. In
other words, the loss had already occurred by the time Defendant separated
from the venture.

Any intervening events Defendant identifies do not

undermine the causal nexus.
Even if Bill's conb·ol of the company and the FD A's seizure of the
product were relevant, those intervening events do not undermine the
causal nexus because they were foreseeable. In the context of restitution,
this Court has held that an intervening force does not make a victim's loss
too attenuated from the defendant's actions as long as the intervening force
i

i

(jj

is reasonably foreseeable. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 543-45 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997). In McBride, for example, the defendant was caught joyriding,
the police were unable to locate the owner of the car because they
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mistranscribed the vehicle's information, and the car was impounded and
eventually sold. Id. at 540-41. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution for
the car, but he argued on appeal that the police's negligent conduct was an
intervening cause that broke the causal nexus between his criminal conduct
and the victim's loss.

Id. at 541.

This Court rejected the argument,

concluding that the causal nexus was not broken because "the negligence of
the police in transcribing the vehicle identification number was [not] so
unforeseeable as to supersede the fault" of the defendant in causing the loss.

Id. at 544.
1.

The causal chain is not factually too attenuated.

Defendant argues that the causal chain is factually too attenuated
because the Markhams' loss was a result of "production noncompliance
with federal regulations." Aplt. Br. at 26. In other words, he argues that the
Markhams lost the value of their investment not because of Defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, but because the FDA seized
the inventory as a result of Bill's actions at a tilne when Defendant was not
involved in the venture. Aplt. Br. at 24. The inventory, he claims, was not
valueless when he gave it to Bill. Aplt. Br. at 37.
But the Markhams' loss of their security occurred in 2007 when they
invested in a company laden with debt and unable to sell enough product to
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cover basic operating expenses.

Neither Omar's original company,

Defendant's distribution company, nor Bill's subsequent company ever
made a profit. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 476, 482. Each
company had significant debt, and although some sales apparently took
place, most fell through. R343:89, 110, 121-22; 346:78; 347:353, 476. And
Defendant was aware of the financial state of the Clarcon venture when he
separated from it.

R347:382, 417, 432, 434-38, 476, 482.

Thus, the

Markhams' loss of the complete value of their invesbnent would have been
reasonably foreseeable to Defendant and anyone else in that situation. Cf

State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, 8jf ~45-48, 224 P.3d 720 (concluding that
value of a loan co-defendant took out using victims' investment as collateral
"flow[ed] from the fraudulent securities transaction and [was] properly
charged against" defendant, but remanding to determine whether to credit
defendant for payments victims received on their investment).
The inventory Defendant returned to Bill did not change the
company's financial situation. With a retail value of $500,000, the inventory
was not "valueless" on its face. But its value was not sufficient to offset the
debts that Bill had also assumed in exchange for his investment, particularly
in light of lackluster product sales and high operating expenses.
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The

seizure of the product in 2009 simply put an end to Bill's persistent and
futile efforts to salvage the investment.
Significantly, the reason that the FDA seized the product was not
because of Bill's noncompliance with federal regulations. Rather, it did so
because the product that Defendant got the Markhams to invest in was
unsafe.

R343:110-12.

That fact is clear from the exhibits Defendant

presented to the trial court in opposition to the State's restitution request.
The FDA inspection report listed several procedural violations, ranging
from a lack of quality controls to poor record keeping. R157-60. The report
was issued at the beginning of May 2009. R160. The FDA did not seized the
inventory then or take any other adverse action against Bill's company. It
was not until June 2009 that the FDA ordered the company to cease
production of the contaminated product, recall it, and destroy it. R153-55;
343:110-12. Then on July 31, 2009, the FDA seized the company's product
because it was not satisfied with the company's recall and destruction
efforts.

R153-55; 343:110-12.

The seizure was based not on regulatory

noncompliance. It was based on the presence of harmful bacteria in the
product.

R153-55; 343:110-12.

Though Bill's company had apparently

added other product lines, it was producing the same product in 2009 as it
was when Defendant convinced Bill to invest in Clarcon in 2007. R26-27,
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155. Defendant has not shown that Omar ever changed the formula or that
the product that was unsafe in 2009 was somehow safe in 2007.
The Markhams' loss is thus not factually attenuated from Defendant's
fraudulent actions. The loss occurred in 2007, and the FDA's seizure of the
product merely put an end to the Markhams' attempts to recover from that
loss. Given Defendant's intimate knowledge of the abysmal financial state
of the Clarcon venture, it was reasonably foreseeable that the Markhams
would not recoup their investment. 11

11

Defendant also presents what he terms an alternative argument,
asserting that if the inventory he returned to Bill is deemed worthless, fault
for its loss in value should be apportioned to Bill. Aplt. Br. at 33-37.
Although Defendant relies on comparative negligence statutes and cases to
support his argument, the argument is really a restatement of his claim that
the causal nexus is too attenuated because Bill is responsible for the loss.
To the extent Defendant intends to present an independent argument
based on comparative negligence, that argument is unpreserved and should
not be addressed. R148-*49, *159-77. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r11,
10 P.3d 346 (" As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may
not be raised on appeal."). The argument is also foreclosed by precedent.
In the appropriate case, "comparative negligence may be relevant in
determining restitution." Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I27 (emphasis added). But
as its name suggests, comparative negligence applies only to negligence
actions. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Securities fraud explicitly requires a mental state of willfulness. Utah Code
Ann. §§61-1-1; 61-1-21; State v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112, 'UlO, 349 P.3d 797
(reiterating that securities fraud requires a mental state of willfulness;
recklessness does not suffice).
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2. The causal chain is not temporally too attenuated.
Defendant also argues that the causal chain is temporally too
attenuated because Bill's company was dissolved two years after Defendant
was last involved in the venture. Aplt. Br. at 25. For support, Defendant
points to State v. Brown, where this Court held that relocation expenses
incurred seven to eight months after a burglary and assault were temporally
too attenuated from the crimes to justify restitution. Aplt. Br. at 25.

See

Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ,I,Il, 11.
Again, the Markhams' loss of their investment was reasonably
foreseeable, even if it took two years for Bill to give up his efforts to salvage
that investment. Defendant's argument about temporal attenuation would
have more force if the venture had been profitable up until the FDA seized
the inventory. But it was not. As discussed, the undisputed evidence is that
Clarcon-in all its iterations-never made a profit.

346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482.

R343:99-100, 121;

When Defendant left the

venture, Bill had the fixed assets of the company and the product inventory.
But he also had its debts. And selling the product to cover those debts and
any operating expenses apparently was not as easy as Defendant had led
Bill to believe it would be. R343:89, 107, 110, 121-22; 346:78; 347:353. Given
the venture's financial history, of which Defendant was well aware, the loss
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of the Markhams' investment was reasonably foreseeable no matter how
long Bill worked to salvage it.
Defendant convinced Bill and Susan to part with $247,000 based on
material misrepresentations and omissions. Aside from a single thousanddollar check, the Markhams never recouped any of their money because it
was a bad investment from the very beginning. That did not change when
Bill took over control of the company and Defendant gave Bill the inventory
he had been keeping as security.
*

*

*

In sum, the Markhams' loss is clear, as is the causal nexus between it
and Defendant's fraudulent actions.

The causal nexus did not become

attenuated because of what happened after Defendant left the picture. The
security the Markhams received- Bill's position in the company- was
valueless from the time he received it in 2007 to the time he abandoned it in
2009. Given the debts, the high operating costs, the lackluster sales, and the
ultilnate seizure of the product, the inventory Defendant gave Bill did not
affect the value of the Markhams' security. The trial court thus acted within
its broad discretion when it ordered Defendant to pay $164,723.17 in
restitution.
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II
The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's
conclusion that Defendant caused the victims' loss.
Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
the trial court's conclusion that he caused the Markhams' loss. Aplt. Br. at
43-45. Defendant acknowledges that the State presented evidence that he
caused the Markhams' loss of their initial $247,000 investment. Aplt. Br. at
43. But he argues that once he responded with evidence that an offset was
appropriate, the State was required to rebut that evidence. Aplt. Br. at 43.
He thus argues that the trial court's causation ruling was clearly erroneous
because the State presented no evidence of a connection between the
product inventory and the dissolution of Bill's company due to regulatory
noncompliance. Aplt. Br. at 43-45.
Regardless of whether the burden-shifting scheme Defendant
describes is accurate, Defendant has not demonstrated that an offset was
appropriate. As shown above, the relevant inquiry is whether the record
contains evidence of the causal nexus between Defendant's fraudulent actions
and the Markhams' loss of their $247,000 investment-not between the
inventory and the FDA' s actions. The product inventory is relevant only to
the extent that it had value sufficient to con1pensate the Markhams for at
least some portion of their investment.
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discussion above, the record contains evidence sufficient to support the
conclusion that the inventory was not sufficiently valuable to compensate
the Markhams, either when Defendant gave it to Bill or when Bill ultimately
gave up his effort to salvage his investment two years later. R343:89, 99100, 107, 110, 121-22; 346:78, 107; 347:353, 382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482.
The evidence necessary to rebut Defendant's claim of an offset was already
in the record, having been admitted at trial. Furthermore, the evidence of
each Clarcon entity's financial disarray was undisputed at trial.
Defendant asserts in passing that Bill's company had $6 million in
sales after Defendant left the company. Aplt. Br. at 31; R168-69. But even if
that is correct, it does not account for the undisputed trial testimony that
each iteration of Clarcon was beset with debt and high operating costs and
could never generate enough sales to make a profit. R343:89, 99-100, 110,
121-22; 346:78, 107; 347:353, 382, 417, 432, 476, 482.

Saddled with the

venture' s liabilities, Bill worked for two years to salvage his investment but
ultimately failed.

R343:110-11, 114.

The trial court's conclusion that

Defendant caused the Markhams' loss is not clearly erroneous, particularly
when viewed in light of record evidence that no matter how much
inventory was actually sold, it never resulted in any recovery of the
Markhams' inveshnent.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on April 6, 2016.
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2012)

Utah Code Annotated§ 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful

It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly to:
<iP

(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (West 2012)

Utah Code Annotation § 61-1-3. Licensing of broker - dealers, agents,
investment advisers, and investment adviser representatives

(1) It is unlawful for a person to transact business in this state as a broker-dealer
or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter.
(2)(a) It is unlawful for a broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an agent
unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective during any
period when the agent is not associated with:
(i) a particular broker-dealer licensed under this chapter; or
(ii) a particular issuer.
(b) When an agent begins or terminates an association with a broker-dealer or
issuer, or begins or terminates activities as an agent, the agent and the
broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify the division.
(c) An agent who terminates an association with a broker-dealer or issuer is
considered to be unlicensed until the day on which the division:
(i) approves the agent's association with a different broker-dealer or issuer;
and
(ii) notifies the agent of the division's approval of the association.
(d)(i) It is unlawful for a broker-dealer or an issuer engaged, directly or
indirectly, in offering, offering to purchase, purchasing, or selling a security in
this state, to employ or associate with an individual to engage in an activity
related to a securities transaction in this state if:
(A)(I) the license of the individual is suspended or revoked; or
(II) the individual is barred from employment or association with a
broker-dealer, an issuer, or a state or federal covered investment
adviser; and
(B) the suspension, revocation, or bar described in Subsection (2)(d)(i)(A) is
by an order:
(I) under this chapter;
(II) of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
(III) of a self-regulatory organization; or
(IV) of a securities administrator of a state other than Utah.
(ii) A broker-dealer or issuer does not violate this Subsection (2)( d) if the
broker-dealer or issuer did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the suspension, revocation, or bar.
(iii) An order under this chapter may modify or waive, in whole or in part,
the application of Subsection (2)( d)(i) to a broker-dealer or issuer.
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(3) It is unlawful for a person to transact business in this state as an investment
adviser or as an investment adviser representative unless:
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter;
(b) the person's only clients in this state are:
(i) one or more of the following whether acting for itself or as a trustee with
investment control:
(A) an investment company as defined in the Investment Company Act of
19401;
(B) another investment adviser;
(C) a federal covered adviser;
(D) a broker-dealer;
(E) a depository institution;
(F) a trust company;
(G) an insurance company;
(H) an employee benefit plan with assets of not less than $1,000,000; or
(I) a governmental agency or instrumentality; or
(ii) other institutional investors as are designated by rule or order of the
director; or
(c) the person:
(i) is licensed in another state as an investment adviser or an investment
adviser representative;
(ii) has no place of business in this state; and
(iii) during the preceding 12-month period has had not more than five
clients, other than those specified in Subsection (3)(b), who are residents of
this state.
(4)(a) It is unlawful for:
(i) a person required to be licensed as an investment adviser under this
chapter to employ an investment adviser representative unless the
investment adviser representative is licensed under this chapter, except that
the license of an investment adviser representative is not effective during any
period when the person is not employed by an investment adviser licensed
under this chapter;
(ii) a federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or associate with an
investment adviser representative having a place of business located in this
state, unless the investment adviser representative is:
(A) licensed under this chapter; or
(B) exempt from licensing; or
(iii) an investment adviser, directly or indirectly, to employ or associate with
an individual to engage in an activity related to providing investment advice
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in this state if:
(A)(I) the license of the individual is suspended or revoked; or
(II) the individual is barred from employment or association with a
state or federal covered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or issuer;
and
(B) the suspension, revocation, or bar is by an order:
(I) under this chapter;
(II) of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
(III) a self-regulatory organization; or
(IV) a securities administrator of a state other than Utah.
(b)(i) An investment adviser does not violate Subsection (4)(a)(iii) if the
investment adviser did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the suspension, revocation, or bar.
(ii) An order under this chapter may waive, in whole or in part, the
application of Subsection (4)(a)(iii) to an investment adviser.
(c) When an investment adviser representative required to be licensed under
this chapter begins or terminates employment with an investment adviser,
the investment adviser shall promptly notify the division.
(d) An investment adviser representative who terminates association with
an investment adviser is considered unlicensed until the day on which the
division:
(i) approves the investment adviser representative's association with a
different investment adviser; and
(ii) notifies the investment adviser representative of the division's
approval of
the association.
(5) Except with respect to an investment adviser whose only clients are those
described under Subsections (3)(b) or (3)(c)(iii), it is unlawful for a federal
covered adviser to conduct advisory business in this state unless the person
complies with Section 61-1-4.
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Utah Code Ann. 61-1-21 (West 2012)

Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-21. Penalties for violations

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates:
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16;
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a
material respect.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person who willfully violates
Section 61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth less than $10,000; or
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed,
the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained
was worth $10,000 or more.
(3) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree
felony if:
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; and
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any
money representing:
(i) equity in a person's primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account;
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code1;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue
influence; or
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(4) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
three years or more than 15 years if:
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any
money representing:
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(i) equity in a person's primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account;
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue
influence; or
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(5) It is an affirmative defense under this section against a claim that the person
violated an order issued under this chapter for the person to prove that the
person had no knowledge of the order.
(6) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the
sentencing judge may impose a penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection
61-1-20(2)(6).
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (West 2012)

Utah Code Annotated§ 61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation--Remedies-Limitation of actions

(l)(a) This Subsection (1) applies to a person who:
(i) offers or sells a security in violation of:
(A) Subsection 61-1-3(1);
(B) Section 61-1-7;
(C) Subsection 61-1-17(2);
(D) a rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative
approval of sales literature before it is used; or
(E) a condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-1-11(7); or
(ii) offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2).
(b) A person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable to a person selling the
security to or buying the security from the person described in Subsection
(l)(a). The person to whom the person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment,
costs, and reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of income received on the
security, upon the tender of the security or for damages if the person no
longer owns the security.
(c) Damages are an amount calculated as follows:
(i) subtract from the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender under
Subsection (7)(b) the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the
security; and
(ii) add to the amount calculated under Subsection (l)(c)(i) interest at:
(A) 12% per year:
(I) beginning the day on which the security is purchased by the buyer;
and
(II) ending on the date of disposition; and
(B) after the period described in Subsection (l)(c)(ii)(A), 12% per year on
the amount lost at disposition.
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount equal
to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest,
costs, and attorney fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon
a showing that:
(a) the violation was reckless or intentional; or
(b) the violation was of Subsection 61-1-1(2), was negligent, and it is
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demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the violation involved an
investment by a person over whom the violator exercised undue influence.
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is
not liable under Subsection (l)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission.
(4)(a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer,
every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every
employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or purchase,
and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale or purchase are
also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller or
purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the
burden of proof that the nonseller or nonpurchaser did not know, and in exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability is alleged to exist.
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so
liable.
(5) A tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of
judgment.
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of a person who might
have been a plaintiff or defendant.
(7)(a) An action may not be maintained to enforce liability under this section
unless brought before the earlier of:
(i) the expiration of five years after the act or transaction constituting the
violation; or
(ii) the expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the
facts constituting the violation.
(b) A person may not sue under this section if:
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a time
when the buyer or seller owned the security, to refund the consideration
paid together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, less
the amount of any income received on the security, and the buyer or seller
failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when
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the buyer or seller did not own the security, unless the buyer or seller
rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt.
(8) A person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in
violation of this chapter or any rule or order issued under this chapter, or who
has acquired a purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the
facts by reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may not
base a suit on the contract.
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security to
waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order issued under this chapter is
void.
(10)(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
(b) This chapter does not create a cause of action not specified in this section or
Subsection 61-1-4(6).
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2015)

Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201. Definitions--Sentences or combination of
sentences allowed--Civil penalties

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out
of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and
includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include a codefendant or accomplice.

(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
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(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime
Victims Restitution Act.
(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court,
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall enter:
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of expenses
paid on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims of Crime; and
(ii) an order of restitution for restitution payable to the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime in the same amount unless otherwise ordered by the
court pursuant to Subsection (4)(d).
(d) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under
Subsection (4)(c) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (vi) and provide findings of its decision on the
record.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of
goverm11ental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within
the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to
appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
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(S)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (S)(c)(i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually
transported in a single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make
restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant
shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of
medical care provided to the defendant while in the county correctional
facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided
under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate,
as defined in Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in
Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount
determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily
inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county
correctional facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing
!easonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with
a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
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(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (vi) and shall enter the reason for its order on the
record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2015)

Utah Coe Annotated §77-38a-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.

(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on
the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program,
make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a
prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed,
and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive
or exemplary damages and pain and suffering.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges
upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement,
or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other
jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea.
(9) "Plea in abeyance'' means an order by a court, upon motion of the
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prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from
the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific
conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(10) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions
upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be
held in abeyance.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from
the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a
reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as may be further defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of an offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this
information, except that the person receiving the payment may not be a
codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered
to the public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution
that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a
result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-301 (West 2004)

I.@

Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-301. Restitution - Convicted defendant may be
required to pay

In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001.

\@

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Sentencing and Punishment ~-2100.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2100.
C.J.S. Criminal Law§§ 1771 to 1786.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Restitution,

(@

\@

In general,
Probation, revocation for failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution,
equal protection, see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660,
76 L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308 S.E.2d 63.

Amount of restitution,
~

Restitution calculation, losses caused by offense of conviction, unauthorized use of
credit card, see Hughey v. U.S., U.S.Tex.1990, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 495 U.S. 411, 109
L.Ed.2d 408, on remand 907 F.2d 39.

Restitution as condition of probation,
Bankruptcy, dischargeability of restitution obligations imposed as conditions of
probation, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, U.S.Pa.1990, 110
S.Ct. 2126, 495 U.S. 552, 109 L.Ed.2d 588.
Bankruptcy, restitution obligation discharge, condition of probation, see Kelly v.
Robinson, U.S.Conn.1986, 107 S.Ct. 353, 479 U.S. 36, 93 L.Ed.2d 216.
Consideration of alternatives to incarceration before revocation, see Black v.
Romano, U.S.Mo.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 471 U.S. 606, 85 L.Ed.2d 636, rehearing denied
105 S.Ct. 3548, 473 U.S. 921, 87 L.Ed.2d 671.
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, equal protection, see
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, on
remand 167 Ga.App. 334,308 S.E.2d 63.
Resentencing, drug possession, see U.S. v. Granderson, U.S.Ga.1994, 114 S.Ct. 1259,
511 U.S. 39, 127 L.Ed.2d 611.
Current_through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2015)

Utah Code Annotated §77-38a-302. Restitution criteria

(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim
for all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court
record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any crhninal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity,
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
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(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized
by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
reha bili ta tion;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment
at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in
the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider:
(i) the factors listed in Subsections (S)(a) and (b);
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial
declaration described in Section 77-38a-204;
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant;
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or
on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and
the method of payment; and
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (S)(d)(ii), the court shall determine
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one
year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons
and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing,
refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for
determination of restitution.
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bi rd)
1

physically gave you or delivered the check?

2

A.

Judy.

3

Q.

Who's Judy?

4

A.

She is the -- Lane Bird's sister, and accountant to

5

the company.

6

Q.

Is that Judy Johnson?

7

A.

Yes, it is.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Other than the $1,100 check that you

received, did you ever receive any salary payment at all?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

The paragraph mentions commissions.

12

make any commissions?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Why not?

15

A.

Never got a check.

16

17

Did you ever

Sales apparently were not there,

and there was no commissions to be paid.
Q.

Talks about a corporate profit sharing plan.

And

18

again, I'm still focussing on paragraph 6.

19

again, you were going to be part of some profit sharing plan

20

that would give you portions of the profits of this company, or

21

these companies?

Did you believe,

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Flipping over the page to paragraph 7.

This

You have been

24

mentions your involvement in Clarcon Labs.

25

appointed COO -- that's chief operating officer; is that

78
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(August 28. 2012 - State v. Bird)
1

2

out of personal funds.
Q.

So ultimately what happens with the company after

3

Mr. Bird is dismissed?

You already indicated to this Court

4

that you've got $247,000 invested in this company.

5

and make the company work after the Defendant was dismissed?

Did you try

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You did that by forming this new company with

8

Mr. Bonada?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

What. what ultimately happens to the company, sir?

11

A.

It closes.

12

Q.

Were you ever able to produce and market this

13

product like you had hoped?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Company ever make a profit?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

How long did you continue to try and get this

18

company up and working?

19

A.

For a couple years.

20

Q.

When you formed this partnership with Mr. Bonada and

21

you began to be involved in the company to that extent, can you

22

describe the financial condition of the company at the time?

23

A.

Pretty bad, when I finally got into the records.

24

Lot of debt.

25

Agreements had been changed between distributors.

Lot of overhead.

Virtually nothing in sales.
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bird)
1

2

Q.

At some point there were some issues with the FDA,

correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

They see some of your product at some point,

5

correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Now, including your $247,000 investment that you

8

made when the Defendant was still involved in the company, how

9

much money have you and your wife lost as a result of your

10

involvement with Clarcon over the years you tried to get it

11

running?

12

into this venture?

How much money, including the $247,000, have you put

13

A.

In full, about 440,000.

14

Q.

Can you briefly explain to this Court how this has

15
16

impacted your life?
A.

Aside from the obvious of financial indebtedness.

17

And working in excess of 60, 70, 80 hours a week in the

18

mortgage industry to try to pay the bills, and also to

19

subsidize Clarcon Labs (inaudible) the company.

20

obviously our house, we've been trying to salvage.

We

Been trying to work with the mortgage company to try

21
22

to work with us on the second mortgage, which they don't want

23

to do.

24

course we have no retirement.

25

like being 18 years old all over again and having to start over

And the house is going up for a short sale.

And of

We have no other funds.

It's
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bi rd)
1

2
3

financially.

Q.

Four hundred and forty thousand dollars you put in

is gone?

4

A.

Gone.

5

Q.

Prior to your investment what, if anything, did the

6

Defendant discuss with you about being licensed or not licensed

7

to sell securities in the State of Utah?

8

A.

No discussion.

9

Q.

Did the Defendant ever discuss with you in any way

10

the nature and extent of his civil litigation history?

11

discuss with you the fact that he had prior civil judgments

12

against him?

Did he

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Did he ever discuss with you the fact that he had

15

prior tax liens against him?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Did he ever mention to you, prior to your

18

investment, that he had applied for and received two separate

19

bankruptcy discharges?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

With respect to your investment, again, you were

22

offered stock, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Did you believe you were purchasing stock?

25

A.

Yes.
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(August 28, 2012 - State vs. Bird - Partial Transcript)
1

or the 89, and what the difference is with 247.

2

say, Hey, you know, I want that money too, you stole it from

3

me?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Okay.

That was never brought up?

Did you ever

Do you have any

6

emails where you ever communicate with him saying, you know,

7

You, you took that money from me?

8

A.

Which money?

9

Q.

Yeah.

10

A.

-- the total amount?

11

Q.

The -- not the 89,648 or the 60,000.

12

amount.

The

89,648,

or --

The difference.

13

A.

That I would have asked for it back?

14

Q.

Yeah.

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

The total

And in October of 2008 you're still running

the company, correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

You're not making any money?

22

A.

(Moves head from side to side.)

23

Q.

Okay.

And still making money?

The company was - -

24

MR. ARGUELLO:

25

THE COURT:

Again

Yes.
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(August 28, 2012 - State vs. Bird - Partial Transcript)
MR. ARGUELLO:

1

2

for an answer.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ARGUELLO:

5

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:

10

Please.
You shook your head.

I'd just ask

for a verbal answer.

6

9

-- I'd just like to ask the witness

No.
Thank you.
Well, definition of making money.

After expenses and everything else, no.

Q.

(By Mr. Gallegos)
Okay.

11

No, I'm not asking any question.

Then you were asked about his civil

12

litigation history, that he never did close that -- disclosed

13

that to you.

Did you ever ask him about any of that?

14

A.

You said I asked about his civil?

15

Q.

You were asked previously, by Mr. Arguello, about

16

you were -- that Lane Bird never disclosed to you the civil

17

litigation history that he had?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

Did you ever ask him?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

And are you aware that, that, you know, judgments

22

and, and court records are generally public knowledge?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

You're not aware of that?

25

A.

(Moves head from side to side.)
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1

A.

(Inaudible.)

2

Q.

-- a stock, isn't when you invest in a stock you're

3

trying to get something of value?

4

A.

You're buying in on the ownership.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Equity position.

7

Q.

Of ownership?

8

A.

Uh-huh.

9

Q.

Which has value, right?

10

Isn't that the whole reason

you're doing it, is to gain value and make some money?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

And, and at the time you entered into this

13

agreement was there any value to, to that document that you had

14

signed?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And what was that?

17

A.

If I could (inaudible) the exhibits?

18

Q.

Please do.

19

A.

Okay.

In my mind, yes.

Referring to State Exhibits No. 1, month one,

20

one hundred forty-six million -- a hundred forty-six thousand

21

five hundred thousand [sic.]

22

166,672.

23

one, $15,426,256.40.

Month two, 156,340.

All the way thorough to year one.

24

Q.

That's what you were relying on?

25

A.

And --

Month three,

And end of year
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1

2
3

regards to some of the people, and I provided some information.

Q.

All I asked is if this is a letter that you

addressed to Lane.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And, and you created that, correct?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

All right.

And it's dated December 6th, 2007?

10

(Pause.)
MR. ARGUELLO:

11

12

No objection, Judge.

If he wants to

move it into evidence, I don't care.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. GALLEGOS:

15

THE COURT:

16

I mean.

Q.

You're offering it?
Yes, your Honor.

I'll receive it.

(By Mr. Gallegos)

Thank you.

So all that, and that's Defense

17

No. 22.

18

this is December 6th of 2007.

19

this letter, all kinds of agreements with cruise lines, the

20

government of Mexico, tomato growers in Mexico, EMEX, and of

21

course the distributors.

But let me just ask you, in this letter essentially
And you've got, according to

You also indicate that you've been approached by

22
23

Costco, and maybe lay out some other things indicating

24

essentially what your company is doing.

25

A.

Right?

Some advertising and some things that we --
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direction we wanted to go, yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

And so, so your business was moving forward?

3

A.

It was moving forward.

This is in reference to the

4

distributors, not specifically with Clarcon Biological Labs,

5

that did not have the contracts (inaudible) the distributors

6

represented the company (inaudible) agreements.

7

the process of (inaudible) agreements.

8

does not necessarily mean they had volume sales.

9

10

Q.

Okay.

They were in

Had agreements.

That

But this -- these were at least some lines

you had in the water?

11

A.

It would be like letter of intents, yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Interest, yes.

14

Q.

And then, and then just finally, you indicated that

15

you formed a new company with Omar Bonada essentially after

16

Lane left the company.

Correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And that went on for a couple years.

19

And then you

said that the company -- you guys closed the company down?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

How exactly was the -- did you guys just close it

22

and terminate it?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

You weren't ordered to terminate your

company?
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1

A.

No, we were not.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Did something occur that affected your

company?
A.

4

Yes.

We -- many of the distributors wanted to get

5

the product approved with FDA through what's called a

6

"monograph" system.

7

put together and submitted to FDA.
And the FDA, when you get your monograph approval,

8

9

And so such documentation and stuff were

then they send out an inspector to look at the facility.

And

10

while looking at the facility they, um, were not necessarily

11

happy with the way that Omar was putting together the product

12

and wanted it done a little differently.
They classified it differently.

13

Wanted some

14

different things put into place with regards to the company,

15

with regards to the production, and the product itself.

16

would have been about, you know, 1.2, 1.5 million dollars to

17

do.
They gave us a time period to be compliant.

18
19

said possibly with 90 to 120 days.

20

samples.

21

some pro - - with some bacteria.

22

contamination whatsoever.

23

had little.

24

25

Which

And we

And then they did take some

And they found some of the samples contaminated with
It was random.

Some had some.

Some had no

Some had lots.

Some

So there was variation throughout the whole thing.
And then FHA came back in -- or FDA came back in and

said that they had the power to cease all production if just
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1

one product had any kind of contamination.

2

did.

3

did not close us down though.

At which point they

They -- so we had to stop producing the product.

They

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

The product was -- they asked for us to voluntarily

6

7
8

9

Didn't they seize a lot of product?

recall the product and destroy the product.
Q.

Well, let me ask you this.

And which we did.

Were U.S. marshals sent

out to seize certain things?
A.

That was done after the fact.

The director of the

10

FDA in Salt Lake, she said that she wanted all the product

11

destroyed a certain way, a certain process, which would cost a

12

lot of money.
I said that we're going to need probably till the

13
14

end of August in order to come up with the money.

15

that point not being able to sell, not being able to produce,

16

not being able to function as a company till that was taken

17

care of, we had to find some money.

18

money to, to get that taken care of.

19

She got antsy.

20

23
24

25

So we were looking for
Get started again.

And she got a little excited.

And -MR. GALLEGOS:

21
22

Because at

Judge, I'm going to object, Judge, to

his characterizations of
Q,

(By Mr. Gallegos)
THE COURT:

Let me, let me just ask --

So state -- ask specific questions.

then don't, don't give us a narrative, sir.

And

Just answer the
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questions.

2

Q.

(By Mr. Gallegos)

The Department of Health and

3

Human Services, through the FDA. the Federal Food and Drug,

4

Drug Administration, essentially -- didn't they issue an order

5

to seize all the product and, and shut down the operation?

6

A.

Not to shut down the operation.

7

Q.

Not to -- so you were still allowed to produce that

8
9

10

and sell it?
A.

(Inaudible.)
MR. ARGUELLO:

I'm going to object to relevance.

11

Again, the focus of this trial is whether or not there were

12

certain misrepresentations or omissions made to this witness by

13

the Defendant.

14

irrelevant to the issues we have to decide.

15
16

17

What happened in 2008 or 2009 with the FDA is

I've let it go for a while. but I don't see the
relevance of this questioning.
MR. GALLEGOS:

Judge, it goes to the credibility.

18

mean, in order for the Court to make a finding, you have to

19

believe Mr. Markham.

20

characterizes things.

21

I

And I think it's going the way he

And the fact that he says his company closed. and

22

now the way he's dancing around this, I think it certainly goes

23

to the credibility that the Court needs to. to make a

24

determination in the way he characterizes statements.

25

THE COURT:

I, I think we've allowed probably about
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as much as I'm willing to allow.

2

going.

3

The company was shut down, even though Mr. Markham doesn't

4

characterize it that, basically shut down because the FDA

5

stopped production.

I think you've got whatever it is you need to get in.

So.

6

MR. GALLEGOS:

7

THE COURT:

8

I think I know where you were

Okay.

The company can still go forward, but if

it had no product to make and distribute, then.
MR. GALLEGOS:

9

So I --

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. GALLEGOS:

I think 22 I -- 22 is entered,

MR. ARGUELLO:

Yes, 22 is in evidence.

12

So we're done.

correct?

13
14

letter written by the Defendant to Mr. Bird.

15

evidence with no objection, Judge.

16

MR. GALLEGOS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. ARGUELLO:

19

THE COURT:

22

Twenty-two is in

Then I don't have anything further.

Mr. Arguello.
Briefly, Judge.

Please.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21

That was a

BY MR. ARGUELLO:

Q.

After Lane leaves the company under the

23

circumstances that you described you tried for a couple of

24

years to get this company running, correct?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

questions that relate to what happened to the company long

2

after Lane is gone.

3

was or wasn't making money.

4

try to make this business work, sir?

Representations about whether the company
Was or wasn't successful.

Did you

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

In the -- well, first of all, how long were you

7

involved in this company?

8

does the company actually shut down?

9

doors?

10

A.

2009.

11

Q.

2009?

You obviously began in 2007.

When

When do you close its

During that two-plus years of involvement was

12

there any a -- was there ever a single month or quarter where

13

this company made an actual profit where your assets exceeded

14

your liabilities, ever?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

You were asked a variety of questions about

Never.

17

documents that are in evidence about agreements, and letters of

18

intent, and all this (inaudible) going somewhere.

19

emails were you attempting to show that the company was making

20

a profit?

In those

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Were you trying to make a profit?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Were any of those, any of those purported agreements

25

or agreements, letters of intent, did they ever ultimately get
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consummated in actual voluminous sales of the product?

2

you ever able to sell the product?

Were

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

And again, just one final question on just the

5

issues that you were cross-examined on.

There was some

6

discussion about a refinancing of the Defendant•s home at some

7

point in 2005.

8

how the defense characterized it.

9

questions, sir?

I think refinancing of the Defendant·s home was

But do you remember those

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Were you involved in any way, shape, or form with

12

that refinancing?

13

A.

With Lane Bird, no.

14

Q.

And with your knowledge (inaudible), who was?

15

Who

was involved in that issue with the Defendant•s home?

16

A.

As far as -- well, his, his dad and my wife.

17

Q.

Okay.

And again, in the course of your work would

18

it be a violation of her fiduciary duty to share information

19

with you about confidential things she would or could be

20

learning about the Defendant•s background; is she allowed to

21

share that with you just because you•re her husband?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

The information that you know about that particular

24

transaction, is that information that simply just came to you

25

in general form by your wife?
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1

2

over at their home for family dinners and things like that.

Q.

When you say you met them because they were Lane's

3

neighbor, fair to say that you knew Lane first, and then

4

through your association with Lane you met the Markhams?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Things at Clarcon got up and running, I think you

7
8

9

said once the capital came in, correct?
A.

We had, we had still done business before that.

And

had done sales, prospecting, marketing, and trying to get

10

things up and going.

11

once the capital came in.

But it expedited, and grew, and expanded

12

Q.

You were a salesman for Clarcon, correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

You mentioned that during the month of -- at least

15

the limited time period you were there that, again, once the

16

capital came in, things were moving.

17

direct was that production increased while you were there after

18

the capital came in.

Correct?

19

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

20

Q.

Who were you selling to?

21
22

23

I think your testimony on

You specifically.

Who did

you sell to?
A.

So it was preliminary.

And I went to trade show.

And I worked with organizations like Blitz USA. Save Mart.

24

Q.

How much product did Blitz USA purchase?

25

A.

We were not able to close the deal prior to their
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1

disagreement.

2

Q.

So the answer to my question is zero.

3

A.

Not to those organizations.

4

SYSCO.

Some representatives of SYSCO.

5

Q.

A case.

6

A.

Probably about 48 bottles or so.

7

Q.

Forty-eight bottles.

8

Correct?

I had sold a case to

And --

How much is a case?

How much is 48 bottles of this

lotion worth?

9

A.

It wasn't much.

10

Q.

Other than SYSCO, who else did you consummate a sale

11
12

with?

A.

Hmm.

I'd have to go back and check my records, but

13

I'm pretty certain there were a couple small ma-and-pa shops

14

that we closed a couple of cases with.

15

Q.

SYSCO and a couple of small mom-and-pop situations?

16

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

17

Q.

Okay.

Just going to show you what's in evidence --

18

these are documents that are in evidence.

19

been present for the trial, but I just want to show you some

20

documents.

21

know you haven't

State's Exhibit 3, 4, and 5.
Just take a look at those documents.

22

whatever time you need.

23

those, just look up.

And take

When you're done flipping through

(Pause.)

24

25

I

MR. ARGUELLO:

And with your permission I'm going to
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1

Q.

What is it?

2

A.

This is a monthly cash flow projection that was done

3

up by Bill after he had, had reviewed -- he'd gone through all

4

the records and books.

5

trying to figure out exactly what we had, what the, what the

6

numbers were, what they needed to be, in order to make

7

decisions on what we need to do to turn it around so we could

8

become profitable.

9

10

Q.

What we were trying to do, he was

So I guess what I'm asking you, is this a

spreadsheet that was given to you, or did you prepare it?

11

A.

Bill prepared this.

12

Q.

Bill prepared that spreadsheet?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And that was based upon what; do you know?

15

A.

That was based upon his review of the records.

16

Q.

Of what records?

17

A.

That were there at Clarcon.

18
19

20

The invoices.

All the

records that were available.
Q.

So did it -- was it -- that had been provided to him

by -- I mean by you and him, or by -- I mean, who was it --

21

A.

Everybody.

22

Q.

The records were provided by who?

23

A.

By me, by Omar, by what was in their old files from

24

Clarconlabs, LLC, to determine the, the costs, and what they

25

had out, and everything that they did.

He put it together and
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1

And so he did.

2

everything.

He spent hours going over all the ledgers and

Our main thing -- the main reason that he started to

3
4

do that, and that we -- he needed to do that is we, we started

5

analyzing all the old ClarconLabs, LLC, invoices and what they

6

were selling product for.

7

there, you know, we started, Okay, how much are they

8

actually -- is it costing them to make a bottle of product?

Well, we started -- when we got

And as Bill was figuring out all those costs, how

9

10

much money we actually had in a bottle, he figured out that the

11

old company, Omar's old company, was actually selling product

12

most of the time for less money than it was costing them to

13

produce.

The dollars were big, but there was no profit --

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

-- because they, they didn't know how to work that

16

out.

17

knew where to put our prices.

18

And that's the main reason that he did that, was so we

Q.

Okay.

And as far as, there was some testimony about

19

whether there was one account or two accounts.

20

accounts -- bank accounts were there?

How many

21

A.

Two.

22

Q.

Two?

23

A.

He had access to the Clarcon Labs and Clarcon

24

Distributing.

25

do it.

And did he have access to those?

Always -- we were going to do it, we just didn't
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1

A.

Everybody except me, and probably --

2

Q.

Do you know if Omar took a paycheck?

3

A.

Omar did.

4

Q.

And what about Bill?

5

A.

Once.

Always had a paycheck.

He would always -- he was always -- it was

6

always known that he would get a paycheck as soon as we could

7

afford to give him a paycheck, yes.

8

9

Q.

Okay.

And what was his paycheck going to be; do you

know?

10

A.

Eight thousand dollars a month.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Never.

13

Q.

All right.
MR. GALLEGOS:

14

15

And you never got a paycheck?

further, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ARGUELLO:

18

We're going to take a break.
Thank you.

I was going to say, I

need to run to the restroom.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. ARGUELLO:

21

THE COURT:

We'll take 15 minutes.
Thank you, Judge.

Come back at five after.
(A recess was taken.)

22
23

THE COURT:

24

MR. ARGUELLO:

25

I don't think I have anything

Go ahead.
Thank you, Judge.

With the Court's

permission.
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1

evidence that's in evidence, none of the bank records --

2

summaries of the bank records here in evidence reflect any of

3

these sales, correct?

4

5
6

7

A.

No, because we don't have any of the bank records,

records from Clarconlabs, LLC.
Q.

So what we have is essentially we have to rely on

your testimony, correct?

8

A.

Sure.

9

Q.

You were shown projections that I think are in

10

evidence as State's Exhibit 1, correct?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And that's exactly what those are, right?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Projections, correct?

15

A.

Projections, yes.

16

Q.

Who created those projections?

17

A.

I created these projections.

18

Q.

Based on what?

19

A.

Projections provided me by the three individuals at

20

21
22

Clarconlabs, LLC.

Q.

So that is what the company hoped to be producing,

correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

It's what they had purchase orders to produce.
Fair to say that the company never met

anywhere near those projections, correct?
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1

A.

I would say that that is fair.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Did you ever see any audited financial

statements for any of the Clarcon businesses, sir?

4

A.

No, sir.

5

Q.

Was a financial audit ever done of the business, to

6

your knowledge?

7

A.

Not that I'm aware of, no.

8

Q.

You never saw anything, got anything, or passed

9

along anything to Mr. Markham that was an audited

10

representation of the company's current assets versus

11

liabilities. correct?

12

A.

No, sir.

13

Q.

Flip to the second page of State's Exhibit No. 1.

14

That document, again, is something that you gave to Bill

15

Markham, correct?

16

projected sales, correct?

As evidence, again, that there were

17

A.

I believe so, yes.

18

Q.

And again, you got that from Omar, correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And I think you testified on direct examination you

21

had no idea about Mexican markets, correct?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

You had no idea whether or not those projections

24

25

were legitimate or not legitimate, correct?
A.

Correct.
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1

going to bring in those comments, Judge, in context.

2

you were only told about two of his comments and there's a

3

paragraph down below that clarifies it.
THE COURT:

4

5

Because

I don't have anything in evidence.

If

you want to have him review it to refresh his recollection --

6

MR. GALLEGOS:

Well --

7

THE COURT:

and ask him some specific questions,

8

I'll allow you to do that.
MR. GALLEGOS:

9

10

I don't want him to read it.

him.

THE COURT:

11

12

MR. ARGUELLO:

17

Correct.

And he has not said that he

doesn't remember saying something at this point.
MR. GALLEGOS:

15
16

Although I don't know that it's --

that's appropriate either, because it's not his work product.

13
14

Well, that's what I was going to ask

Okay.

Well, let me, let me just ask

Let me --

him.

Q.

(By

Mr. Gallegos)

Do you recall when you were being

18

asked about the -- by the investigator about the company being

19

a mess financially?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And your response was:

22

"They were a mess financially.

23

were a mess procedurally.

24

manufacturing was. I would call it

25

archaic at best."

They

Their
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And then do you recall explaining or qualifying that

1

2

statement?

3

A.

Well, I just think that they could use a lot of

4

help.

5

was a long way you could go with that if you modernized and

6

brought things up to par with how you should run a business.

7

Q.

And there·s a long way you could -- there was a, there

Do you recall telling him:
11

8

You know, at the time, I mean, they

made it sound like it was, you know, 5 or

9

10

20 thousand dollars."

11

When you were asked by Investigator Nielsen:

12

how far behind are they in debt?

Your response was:

14

in there I learned that it was

15

significantly more than that.

16

couldn t tell you what the exact numbers

17

were, but it was significantly more than

18

had been represented."

19

MR. ARGUELLO:

I'm going to object to form.

20

MR. GALLEGOS:

Well, I'm going to --

And I

1

Q.

(By Mr. Gallegos)

22

MR. GALLEGOS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GALLEGOS:

25

Like,

"But later on down the line when we're

13

21

11

Do you remem --

I guess, Judge, he

How -- what -- I
I can ask him if he recalls saying

that because he was asked specifically about comments he made
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1

about the company.

2

are --

And, I mean. you know, as these transcripts

THE COURT:

3

Let me, let me just indicate to you, I'm

4

going to let it in.

5

sounds to me like it's going to be more damaging to your client

6

than it is -- I'd consider what you want to put in and what you

7

don't.
I'm going to allow you to put whatever you. you want

8

9

But based on what I've heard you say, it

in as it relates to this specific instance, but.

10

MR. GALLEGOS:

11

Okay.

(By Mr. Gallegos)

Q.

Well, I just, I mean, was that

12

your

13

into the company and figured everything out, they're -- they

14

were a lot worse off than what you had envisioned?

15

did you explain to the investigator that once you got

A.

Yeah.

And that's what I addressed in my testimony.

16

The fact that we figured out when you took cost per bottle,

17

that they were actually selling a lot but not making any money.

18

And that's what I was referring to.

19

Q.

Okay.

And you're, you're discussing this with the

20

investigator June of 2010.

21

benefit of hindsight and seen everything that occurred?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

exhibit ...

25

So this is after you've got the

And, and then you were asked about the, the

(inaudible) find it easier.
There's Defense Exhibit 1, the -- and it's this one
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1

2

A.

No.

Just the agreement for -- when you say "actual

stock," we had not -- the certificates had not been ordered.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Had not been.

5

Q.

Was there even any, I mean, was there a value in any

6

And was there --

company at that point?

7

A.

No, there was not.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

10

this thing got off the ground, would be able to do down the
road?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

And, uh.

MR. GALLEGOS:

13
14

This was an agreement that you guys, provided

Judge, I think that's all the

questions I have.

15

THE COURT:

Anything else?

16

I have a question that I'm very interested in.

17

turn to State's Exhibit 9.

18

register?

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

21

Sir,

It's the Powerslide Tools check

Okay.
Can you see there on February 20th there

was a check to Clarconlabs for $25,000?

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

Yes.
And also on February 22nd there was a

24

check or a transfer, I'm not sure what it was exactly, but a

25

transfer to Clarcon for $10,000; is that correct?
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1

security, correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

You had business proposals that were given to

you by Omar, Defendant's Exhibit 3, correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

You were shown, by Omar, proof of prior sales of the

7

product, correct?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You had projections that were given to you, correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

You were shown checks -- I think it's

12

Defendant's 19, I think.

13

represented sales

14

different vendors?

You were shown multiple checks that

or purchases of the product, correct,

by

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

So it's your testimony that when you get involved in

17
18
19
20

Clarcon the company is a thriving company?
A.

I wouldn't say "thriving."

It looked like it was

doing darn good.

Q.

Doing darn good.

21

Making sales.

22

money, correct?

The company was doing darn good.

Looked like it was making a profit, making

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And that's your testimony?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

Sure about that?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

You remember back on June 22nd of 2010 you went and

4

had a meeting with the investigator in this case, Jeffrey

5

Nielsen.

Do you remember that?

6

A.

Yes, I do.

7

Q.

And you sat down. and he asked you a bunch of

8

questions and you answered a bunch of questions, correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Went through everything that you could possibly

11

remember about what occurred with this Clarcon venture that you

12

had embarked on, correct?

13

14

15
16

A.

Yeah.

We were, we were scratching the surface of an

old, old bad memory.

Q.

You told the investigator, sir, did you not, that

the company was a mess?

17

A.

Management.

18

Q.

Management.

19

A.

Yeah.

20

Q.

They didn't know what they were doing?

21

A.

They didn't, they didn't know how to. how to do

Just management?

They didn't know what they were doing.

22

things what I would consider properly and in step for the

23

business to be in a potential that they could be.

24

was a mess.

25

Q.

It was. it

Accounting-wise it was a mess.
So accounting-wise it was a mess as well, correct?
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

Management-wise it was a mess, correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Accounting-wise it was a mess, correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Financially it was a mess, wasn't it?

7

A.

Didn't look like it on paper, but.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Sir, isn't it true you

told -- well, withdrawn.

10
11

Well, let me ask you.

Do you remember being asked the following questions
by Investigator Nielsen and giving the following answers:

12

What kind of things were a

"Question:
mess?

13

14

"Answer:

15

"Question:

16

"Answer:

Everything.
When you say 'everything'?
They were a mess financially.

17

They were a mess procedurally.

18

manufacturing was, I would call it

19

archaic at best."

20

Do you remember hearing those questions and giving

21
22
23
24

25

Their

those answers?
A.

Yes.
MR. GALLEGOS:

Judge, can I just ask, he's reading,

what page he was referring to?
MR. ARGUELLO:

Yes.

I will say, Judge, this was
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1

provided to the Court and Counsel prior to trial.

2

transcript of the interview.

3

transcript.

4

THE COURT:

5

SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

6

This was a

I was reading from page 6 of the

Thank you.
Those -- Che?

Those pages are off

a little bit from what these copies show.
MR. ARGUELLO:

7

And the printout I have may -- the

8

pages may be a little off.

9

refer to this, please let me know, and I'll try to find i t for

10

you.
THE COURT:

11
12

If you're unable to find it when I

That's fine.

I'm not sure that it's

necessary at this particular point for me to do that, but --

13

MR. ARGUELLO:

Correct.

14

THE COURT:

I will find it.

15

SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

16

MR. ARGUELLO:

One sec.
(Pause.)

17
18

Che.

Q.

(By Mr. Arguello)

And in fact the company -- and

19

when I say ''the company," at the time you get involved the

20

company is Clarconlabs. LLC, correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

So the company, isn't it in fact true, was a

23
24

25

complete mess?
A.

It was not living up to what it could be done if it

was operated correctly.
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1

Q.

My question is a "yes

11

or "no" question, sir.

2

You've heard -- we've heard your testimony.

3

some things you said to the investigator.

4

company was a complete mess?

We've discussed
Yes or no, the

5

A.

In my opinion, it was a mess.

6

Q.

You were going to be the company's savior, correct?

7

A.

I wouldn't characterize myself as a "savior," no.

8

Q.

Going back to that June 22nd, 2002, interview with

9

10

11

Mr. Nielsen.

Do you recall being asked the following question

and giving the following answer:
"Question:

Okay.

Were you offered

12

some sort of role inside the company, or

13

did they ask you just to work for them?

14

"Answer:

They wanted me, they wanted

15

me to do everything for them.

16

wanted me to come in and just be their

17

savior and take care of them and

18

whatever.

19

They

"And I tried again over the, you know,

20

I don't know, maybe a week or two, you

21

know.

22

know, checked out their stuff, you know.

23

They, they wanted me to come in to be a

24

partner.

25

I looked into some things and, you

Do everything.

"And I said, 'Well, I managed to become
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